



**FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE**  
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December 10, 1993

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[REDACTED]  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, DC 20505

F(b)(1)  
 F(b)(3)  
 (N)

Dear [REDACTED]:

Our conversation last week was most enjoyable and, having been Special Assistant to a very active Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of my own.

F(b)(1)  
 F(b)(3)  
 (N)

As threatened, please find enclosed a brief list of proposals that might be of interest: several concern key political developments in Russia and the NIS; one concerns China and the longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposal offers a unique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike the Director's interest.

I appreciate your willingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further information or for that matter, any "special assistance" from a former special assistant.

With best wishes,

Harvey Sicherman

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Enclosures



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# **PROPOSAL SUMMARIES**

December 10, 1993

Foreign Policy Research Institute  
3615 Chestnut Street  
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Contact: Harvey Sicherman, 215-382-0685, ext. 110

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## THREE PROPOSALS ON RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

For these three proposals, the principal investigator is **Martha Brill Olcott** (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1978). A specialist on Russia, Central Asia, and Islam, Dr. Olcott has spent many years in the former USSR, especially in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. She has authored or edited three books, including *Islam in Everyday Life: Religion in Rural Central Asia* (M.E. Sharpe, 1991), *The Kazakhs* (Hoover Institution Press, 1987), and *The Soviet Multinational State* (M.E. Sharpe, 1987). She is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a professor of political science at Colgate University.

## CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan is one of the most important "fault-line" states -- even perhaps the most important -- in the NIS. Kazakhstan has the potential to be wealthy and stable; if political and economic problems prevent the republic from achieving that potential, what hope do other, less "gifted" states have? The current political and social situation in the republic is extremely delicate. The immediate and short-term fate of Kazakhstan will be indicative not only of the future of Central Asia, but of Russia as well.

**This project would seek to answer five specific questions:**

1. Are the ideologies of Kazakhstan's major ethnic and political communities moving farther apart?
2. To what degree is Kazakhstan developing regional interests?
3. What impact will this emerging regionalism have as Kazakhstan begins local elections in 1994?
4. Can the existing unitary political system deal with Kazakhstan's growing list of problems?
5. Can Kazakhstan develop a national identity which can serve as the basis for domestic stability and formation of international policy?

## THE TENSION BETWEEN CENTRALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM WITHIN RUSSIA

Russia began its succession of the Soviet Union committed to decentralization; the stalemate with Parliament and subsequent events has swung political indicators ~~DATE: OCT 1995~~ **APPROVED FOR RELEASE**, toward the severe centralism of the past. However, the regional needs and interests ~~DATE: OCT 1995~~ **APPROVED FOR RELEASE** have been articulated in the various localities of Russia will still have to be met. This study would monitor the tensions between regionalism and centralism, in four critical localities: the North Caucasus; Western Siberia; the Far East; and the Karelia, St. Petersburg, and Pskov regions.

First, this study would describe each of the areas in detail, explaining why each region is of importance to Russia as a whole. Second, the study would then attempt to answer a number of question for each region:

Are there significant legal differentiations among the regions?

What are the current political agendas in each of the areas, and what will become of these agendas under the new constitution?

Is there any significant leverage which a region can exert in pursuit of local interests?

What likelihood exists of the growth of separatist sentiment of movements, and around what issues?

To what extent are policies in each area designed to facilitate an aggressive Russian foreign in the region across the border?

What impact do these domestic regional issues have upon the formation of Russian foreign policy?

What are the implications for US policy of the development of regional interests in these border area?

### **THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FORMER USSR, AS MEASURED BY PROTECTION FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES**

This project does not seek to duplicate the efforts of international human-rights monitoring organizations. Rather the thesis is that elaboration of mechanisms for safeguarding rights of minorities is a reliable indicator of the process of transformation from ethnic to legal definitions of citizenship, and so measures the degree of political maturation. The study will survey de jure and de facto treatment of three sorts of minority populations, for each of the NIS (including Russia):

1. Minorities in a given state who have a titular state elsewhere (e.g., Russians in the other NIS, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Poles in Lithuania);
2. Peoples who have never had states, but who have been minority members of local populations since pre-Soviet times (e.g., Uighurs and Dungans in Kazakhstan, Cossacks);
3. Peoples who have been moved into existing populations as a result of Soviet policies (e.g., Russians again, but also Meshket Turks in Kyrgyzstan, Lezgins and Avars in Kazakhstan).

The second part of this project would then survey ethnic minority-related issues as factors in foreign policy formation within the NIS. This would permit comparison of expressed concern over other states' treatment of minorities with actual treatment of minorities within a given state, for purposes of determining the degree to which policies of supporting irredentist or foreign minority populations are genuine, and the degree to which they are dictated by other policy ends.

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## CUBA'S ONGOING TRANSITION: LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE

For this proposal, the principal investigator is **Michael Radu** (Ph.D., Columbia University). He is author or editor of 7 books on international affairs, including *Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries* (Transaction) and *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Pergamon Brassey's). He has served as Principal Investigator on 5 contracts with DIA and CIA. A former editor of *Agora*, FPRI's Romanian-language journal of culture and politics, Dr. Radu specializes in post-communist nationalism. He is a resident scholar at FPRI and has taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University. Dr. Radu has monitored elections in Cambodia, Romania, Peru, and Guatemala. He is fluent in Spanish and Romanian.

The experience of most of Eastern Europe and the former USSR since 1989 strongly suggests that the collapse of communism as a political, economic and ideological system did not necessarily translate into the collapse of communism's entire institutional base. While significant variations from country to country are noticeable, in most instances the government and economic bureaucracy, the military, intelligence services and in some cases even the secret police and the communist party have survived largely intact. The very ubiquitousness of this phenomenon suggests that while "communism" as a whole is not reformable, some of its institutional parts possess enough flexibility and are capable to successfully adapt to changing circumstances -- as demonstrated by the fact that in a majority of East European and former Soviet republics prominent members of the communist nomenclatura are still in power -- via elections. This institutional resilience, combined with the lasting appeal of at least some aspects of communism, has facilitated the survival of some institutions of the communist era and proved that change without reform is possible.

Based on the admittedly limited and often circumstantial data available, it appears that recent developments in Cuba suggest important parallels with those of Eastern Europe during the last few years of communist rule. The Cuban case is important in this respect since it provides a unique opportunity to test the post-1989 insights on communist institutional adaptation capacities in a pre-revolutionary environment. To simply declare Castro's regime as an ideological dinosaur is by now insufficient and misleading at best, particularly in light of the adaptative measures (as distinct from *bona fide* reforms) taken by Havana recently. Those measures -- legalization of private hard currency holdings and of limited self-employment, *de facto* tolerance of Western capitalist enclaves -- may not, and probably will not save the Castro regime as is, but they suggest that Castro does try to adapt to the new circumstances -- internal as well as external. At the same time, his regime's individual institutions, such as the PCC, the military, youth and women's organizations, etc., are doing the same and, most importantly, are doing so at varying paces, thus weakening the system's monolithic nature. Simply put, the post-Castro transition has already started, is in the process of definition and it shows incipient signs of going beyond Fidel's ability to control or even understand it.

The question then is the extent to which various institutions, autonomously, by learning from the East European experience or as a result of prodding by Fidel are showing signs of adaptation to change, and what that means for their survival in the post-Castro era. A few examples are relevant:

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a good example of such adaptation without reform. From a loyal pillar of Cuba's regime, they have been **APPROVED FOR RELEASE** and became **DATE OCT 1999** massively involved in the civilian economy -- as a source of cheap and disciplined labor -- a process analogous to that of Ceausescu's Romania during the 1980s. As a process of de-professionalization set in, doubts over the military's loyalty grew at the same time as their surveillance by the secret police intensified. Long a favorite instrument of Castro's foreign policy, the FAR mission is now increasingly seen as imposing internal law and order in an emergency -- in competition with but less trusted than the Interior Ministry.

The economic policy bureaucracy is yet another institutionalized group which is trying to adapt to new circumstances, as the legalization of hard currency holdings and self-employment limits its power and the scope of its activities.

At a more general level, the economic crisis and the general weariness and apathy it has led to has resulted in an extensive effort by the propaganda apparatus, including all the Communist Party's ancillary organizations (youth, women, artists, etc.) to redirect and reframe their efforts, from abstract slogans coming from the top toward references to daily life, the economy and participation. Superficial as those efforts may be, they may well change the relationship between the population and regime in unexpected ways and for the first time allow some inputs from below. That is precisely what happened in the early 1980s in places like Bulgaria and even the USSR under Andropov.

Finally, institutions outside the regime's structure, and thus with a long dormant potential for independence, are beginning to actualize that potential. In Cuba that now applies to the Roman Catholic Church, just as it applied to the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe during the 1980s.

The main issue under examination is not the probable success or failure of Castro's conscious attempts to reform the system, but their unplanned impact, actual or probable, upon existing Cuban institutions. The analytical framework is defined by the experience of Eastern Europe during the 1980s because, as Fidel Castro himself has admitted, there are strong similarities between Cuba's present situation and that of its erstwhile allies in the Warsaw Pact. Most importantly, whether the present developments within Cuba will result in a relatively peaceful transition to a post-Castro regime or in a violent convulsion will have quite different implications for the U.S. role and interests in the island.

## THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH

For this proposal, the principal investigator is **Ross H. Munro**. Mr. Munro joined the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 1990 as a resident scholar and head of its Asia Program, after a distinguished career as a journalist and foreign correspondent. Mr. Munro served as Peking correspondent for *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, Canada's leading national newspaper, and served as Bureau Chief for *TIME Magazine* in Hong Kong, New Delhi, and Bangkok. His recent articles on China and India have appeared in *Policy Review* and *The National Interest*. He has also written for *Foreign Policy* and *Commentary*.

China's explosive economic growth has strategic implications that are difficult to grasp. History has never before witnessed an economy of such size (the world's third largest GNP and its largest workforce) growing at such a rapid rate (8 to 14 percent) for such a sustained period of time (14 years so far, with only one significant pause).

With most of the global economy flaccid at best, the magnitude of China's growth compels the attention of the world's major corporations and financial concerns. Convinced that many of the world's best economic opportunities will be found in China for years to come, most major business groups in Asia, Europe and North America are now courting China's powerholders. The impact on the foreign policies of all OECD members is already discernible. In Asia today, we are seeing the emergence of "clientism," that is, business groups willing to do China's bidding in return for preferential treatment in trade and investment. This is most obvious in Hong Kong but it is also taking root in Southeast Asia and, in a more subtle way, Taiwan.

Meanwhile, largely unnoticed, an economically expansive China is rapidly establishing trade, investment and infrastructural links across its southwest and northwest land frontiers that presage the creation of new spheres of influence. On its southwest frontier, Chinese influence is growing rapidly in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; Burma is already firmly ensconced in China's sphere of influence. On its northwest frontier, China's trade with the five new Central Asian republics is second only to Russia. Significantly, China is proposing joint development with the republics of a New Silk Road of highways, railways and pipelines that would ultimately link China with Iran.

While the Japanese economy still far outstrips China's in size and sophistication, the increasingly serious problems that beset Japan's economy raise questions about its long-term effectiveness as a balancer or challenger to Chinese economic power. Talk of an Asian yen block, for instance, is dead.

China's economic power is magnified throughout Asia by the military weakness of its largest neighbors. The military effectiveness for Japan's expensive self-defense force is problematic; Russia's huge nuclear edge is less significant than the sad state of its army; India this year effectively abandoned its pretense of being China's military rival.

The United States, concerned primarily with human rights and proliferation issues in recent years, has not yet focused on the implications of China's growing economic power. Those implications, both immediate and long term, are profound. Already, the current scale of China's economic growth, combined with the Chinese authorities' eno-mercantilist economic strategy, is creating a flood of low-priced, often effectively subsidized, exports. Simultaneously, China has created a thicket of indirect import barriers. The result is a rapidly growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the largest by far with a non-ally!

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Even the normal workings of market economics will prove disruptive. ~~DATE: 0011999~~ large and rapidly growing China, for instance, has the economic fundamentals favorable to building modern, giant-scale petrochemical complexes with production costs significantly below current world levels.

We propose a study that will document and explore these trends and discuss their implications for the United States, Asia and the world.



TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 09 MAR 1994
TO: ASST. VC ESTIMATES		
ROOM NO. DE 62	BUILDING OHB	
REMARKS: Gayle This is the letter I spoke to you about last week.		
FROM: Jonathan Fredman		
ROOM NO. DE 60	BUILDING OHB	EXTENSION 57558

FORM NO. 1 FEB 56 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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With best wishes,

*Lawry*

Harvey Sicherman  
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		09 MAR 1994
TO:	EAD/DO I / Frankfurt	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
7E 44	OHB	
REMARKS:		
This is the letter I spoke to you about last week.		
FROM: Jonathan Friedman		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
7D68	OHB	37558
FORM NO. 1 FEB 58 241		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		
(47)		

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